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Europe v. USA: Different Standards and Procedures 
in Human Rights Protection
Stephan Breitenmoser & Chiara Piras*
This contribution shows the important role of regional law and institutions in the development and rise of 
international human rights standards. By analyzing two main areas of human rights law – the prohibition of 
the death penalty and data protection – this article outlines how the level of protection guaranteed by the 
European states is far more advanced than equivalent regulations on a universal level or in other regions of the 
world. The examples discussed also confirm that human rights are further developed and strengthened on the 
European level where treaties and procedures ensure a more efficient implementation of the relevant norms 
and, finally, that a sharp divide gradually opens up between Europe and the United States.
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I. Introduction
At the June 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, representatives of 171 states 
unanimously adopted the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action containing the 
principles of universality and indivisibility of human rights. Yet, in this Declaration 
the states also proclaimed that regional arrangements play a fundamental role in pro-
* Stephan Breitenmoser is Professor of European Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Basel, and Judge 
at the Swiss Federal Tribunal of Administrative Law. Chiara Piras is a Researcher at the Faculty of Law, 
University of Basel, and Law Clerk at the Court of Appeals of the Canton of Basel-Country. The authors 
are grateful to Ann Weibel, MLaw, for her valuable support during the drafting of this text.
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moting and protecting human rights and that they should reinforce universal human 
rights standards and their protection. The Conference endorsed efforts to strengthen 
these regional arrangements and to increase their effectiveness, while at the same 
time stressing the importance of cooperation with the United Nations human rights 
activities.1 
Indeed, the dynamic evolution of human rights protection after World War II has 
led to a remarkable network of universal, regional and specialized human rights 
 treaties and procedures. It has also created a close formal and informal cooperation 
within regional bodies. Because of different legal rules, jurisdiction and cultural 
 understanding, this may result in a regionalism that could lead to a fragmentation of 
the international human rights protection system.2 
However, in human rights law such fragmentation should not always be con-
sidered as an infringement or even a violation of the principles of universality and 
indivisibility. On the contrary: The specific development of higher regional stand-
ards, norms and practices may be seen as a first step in reaching a higher common 
standard of human rights protection. As a consequence, more and more internatio-
nal, constitutional and supreme courts may start applying the higher standards and 
follow the positive experiences of more advanced regions in the safeguarding of hu-
man rights.
Numerous examples of regional international law can, in fact, be found in Euro-
pean administrative law.3 These include, in particular, the protection of fundamental 
1 The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna on 25 June 1993, formulated that «All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdepend-
ent and interrelated» (para. I.5) and that «Regional arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting 
and protecting human rights» (para. I.37).
2 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diver-
sification and Expansion of international Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Com-
mission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 of 13 April 2006, para. 5 et seqq., pp. 10 et seqq.; Lars Viellechner, 
Verfassung als Chiffre: Zur Konvergenz von konstitutionalistischen und pluralistischen Perspektiven auf 
die Globalisierung des Rechts, 75 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
(2015), 233–258, pp. 244 et seqq.
3 Cf. Stephan Breitenmoser & Chiara Piras, Regionalisierung des internationalen Menschen-
rechtsschutzes, in: Georg Kreis (ed.), Europa und die Welt: Nachdenken über den Eurozentrismus, Basel 
2012, pp. 77–108; Thomas Cottier et al., Die Rechtsbeziehungen der Schweiz und der Europäischen 
Union, Bern 2014, pp. 554 et seq.; Thomas Cottier, Die Globalisierung des Rechts – Herausforderungen 
für Praxis, Ausbildung und Forschung, 133 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins (1997), pp. 217–
241, pp. 217 et seqq.; Karl Doehring, Völkerrecht, 2nd ed., Heidelberg 2004, at 293; Walter Kälin 
et al., Völkerrecht: Eine Einführung, 4th ed., Bern 2016, p. 91; Bernhard Kempen & Christian 
Hillgruber, Völkerrecht, 2nd ed., München 2012, pp. 304 et seqq.; Jürgen Schwarze, Europä-
isches Verwaltungsrecht, 2nd ed., Baden-Baden 2005, LII et seqq.; Stephen Sedley, Are Human Rights 
Universal, and Does it Matter?, in: Stephan Breitenmoser et al. (eds.), Human Rights, Democracy and the 
Rule of Law, Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Rechtsstaat, Droits de l’homme, démocratie et Etat de 
droit, Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber, Zurich/St. Gallen 2007, pp. 793–803; Alfred Verdross 
& Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, Theorie und Praxis, 3rd ed., Berlin 1984, para. 30; Wolf-
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rights and guaranties such as human dignity, the protection of privacy and basic pro-
cedural rights, which are, in general, of a higher standard than universal international 
law.4 
This article will show and discuss the normative content of two main areas of 
human rights law, which may represent a fragmentation between the level of protec-
tion in Europe and their universal grade of protection in other regions,5 in particular 
in the United States: These two areas being the prohibition of the death penalty and 
data protection.
II. The Prohibition of the Death Penalty 
A. A Post-Second World War Phenomenon
Whilst the death penalty has existed since antiquity,6 international norms addressing 
the limitation and abolition of the death penalty are essentially a post-Second World 
War phenomenon.7 The abolition of the death penalty was first promoted on an in-
ternational level during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
between 1946 and 1948 and the recognition of «the right to life» in its Article 3.8 
After the set-up of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal) to 
prosecute and punish the leaders and organizations of Nazi Germany accused of war 
crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, which provided for the 
possibility of capital punishment,9 only a few states contemplated the abolition of the 
death penalty. This idea, however, gained strength in the following decades. It started 
with the limitation of the death penalty excluding juveniles, pregnant women and 
gang Vitzthum, Völkerrecht, 7th ed., Frankfurt/Bonn 2016, p. 11; Andreas von Arnauld, Zum 
Status quo des europäischen Verwaltungsrechts, in: Jörg Philipp Terhechte (ed.), Verwaltungsrecht der 
Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden 2011, pp. 89 et seqq.; Thomas von Danwitz, Europäisches Ver-
waltungsrecht, Köln 2008, pp. 210 et seqq. 
4 Cf. Thomas Giegerich, Wirkungen und Rang der EMRK in den Rechtsordnungen der Mitglied-
staaten, in: Rainer Grote & Thilo Marauhn (eds.), EMRK/GG, Konkordanzkommentar, 2nd ed., Tü-
bingen 2013, p. 87.
5 Cf. Koskenniemi, supra, n. 2, 95–219, at 102. 
6 Cf. William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 3rd ed.,  Cambridge 
2002, p. 3.
7 Schabas, supra, n. 6, at p. 1.
8 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights Drafting Committee, Draft Outline 
of international Bill of Rights (prepared by the Division of Human Rights), E/CN.4/AC.1/3 of 4 June 
1947, Article 3; First Addendum, E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1 of 11 June 1947, pp. 14–19 and Second Adden-
dum, E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.2 of 9 June 1947.
9 Cf., on the other hand, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, UN 
Doc. S/Res/827 (1993) Annex, Article  24 (1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), Annex, Article 23(1). Both Tribunals can only impose terms of 
imprisonment.
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the elderly and the restriction of the list of crimes for which the death sentence could 
be allowed.10 
On a regional level, the American Convention on Human Rights prevents coun-
tries which have already abolished the death penalty from reintroducing it.11 The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not mention the death penalty. 
Nevertheless, it provides for an unqualified right to life. The African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights adopted a resolution calling for a moratorium on the use 
of capital punishment.12 The Arab Charter of Human Rights proclaims the right to 
life in the same manner as other international instruments, but contains three provi-
sions recognizing the legitimacy of the death penalty in cases of «the most serious 
crimes». It prohibits the death penalty for political offences and excludes capital pun-
ishment for crimes committed by those under the age of eighteen, and for both preg-
nant women and nursing mothers for a period of up to two years following child-
birth.13 The states that still retain the death penalty find themselves increasingly 
subject to international pressure in favor of abolition. This becomes manifest, for 
10 The UN General Assembly, inter alia, affirmed in Resolution 2857 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 the 
desirability of abolishing the death penalty in all countries. This aspiration was reiterated in UN General 
Assembly Resolution 32/61 of 8 December 1977 and in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
62/149 adopted on 18 December 2007, which called for a worldwide moratorium on executions with a 
view to abolishing the death penalty. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) of 16 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 1), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 
20  November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.  3) and in the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those facing the death penalty, 45th 
plenary meeting on 23 July 1996, Resolution 1996/15) the United Nations has established strict condi-
tions under which it may be used by those member states, which have not yet abolished it; Human Rights 
Committee, Judge v. Canada, Communication No. 829/1998, UN Doc. CCPR/C/D/829/1998 of 
5 August 2002. In this case the Human Rights Committee expressed the opinion that for countries that 
have abolished the death penalty there is an obligation not to expose a person to the real risk of its appli-
cation. Thus, they may not remove, either by deportation or extradition, individuals from their jurisdic-
tion, if it may be reasonably anticipated that they will be sentenced to death, without ensuring that the 
death sentence would not be carried out. The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty of 15 December 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414, commits each state party to 
take all necessary measures to permanently abolish the death penalty within its own jurisdiction. How-
ever, this Protocol has only been ratified by 85 states so far (cf. http://treaties.un.org); cf. William A. 
Schabas, The United Nations and Abolition of the Death Penalty, in: Jon Yorke (ed.), Against the 
Death Penalty, International Initiatives and Implications, Surrey 2008, pp. 9–43 with further references.
11 American Convention on Human Rights (1979) 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, Article 4.2.
12 Resolution urging states to envisage a moratorium on the death penalty, 13th Activity Report of the Afri-
can Commission on Human and People’s Rights, OAU Doc. AHG/Dec. 153(XXXVI), Annex IV, 
pp. 45 et seqq. 
13 Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted on 15 September 1994, Council of the League of Arab States 
(102nd sess.), Res. 5437, Articles 10, 11 and 12.
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example, in some states’ refusal to grant extradition, if the person concerned risks 
being exposed to the capital sentence.14
B. The Council of Europe’s Campaign for a World-wide Abolition 
of the Death Penalty
The Council of Europe has been the driving force in the endeavors to transform 
 Europe into a de facto and de jure death penalty free zone.15 It monitors the situation 
in member states to ensure compliance with their commitments and exchanges views 
on the situation of the abolition of the death penalty. It also persuades governments 
to permanently outlaw the death penalty, adopts successive texts and supports all 
initiatives aiming at a worldwide moratorium on the use of the death penalty, in 
particular the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.16 The creation 
of legally binding instruments and the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has greatly contributed to achieving this aim. 
1. Legal Instruments Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty  
in Europe
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provided in 1950 for the pos-
sibility of imposing the death penalty in execution of a court sentence following con-
viction of a crime for which the death penalty was provided by law.17 Since then, the 
legal situation in Europe has changed dramatically: From the late 1960s, a consensus 
began to emerge in Europe that the death penalty seemed to serve no purpose in a 
civilized society governed by the rule of law and respect for human rights. In 1982, 
the Council of Europe adopted Protocol No 6 to the ECHR, the first legally binding 
14 Cf. Chapter II.B; Schabas, supra n. 6, at p. 2; Ulrich Häfelin et al., Schweizerisches Bundesstaats-
recht, 9th ed., Zurich 2016, pp. 107 and 179; Jörg Paul Müller & Markus Schefer, Grund rechte 
in der Schweiz, 4th ed., Bern 2008, p. 50; Robert Weyeneth, Die Menschenrechte als Schranke der 
grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit der Schweiz, recht 2014, pp. 117 and 120.
15 Cf. Roger Hood & Caroline Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective, 5th ed., Oxford 
2015, pp. 49 et seqq. as to the abolition of the death penalty in European countries; Jon Yorke, The 
Evolving Human Rights Discourse of the Council of Europe: Renouncing the Sovereign Right of the 
Death Penalty, in: Jon Yorke (ed.), supra n. 10, pp. 43–75 with further references.
16 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2012 on the report of the Third Commit-
tee (A/67/457/Add.2 and Corr.1), UN Doc. A/RES/67/176.
17 Cf. original wording of Article 2 para. 1.
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instrument providing for the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime.18 Since 
then, all member states of the Council of Europe have abolished the death penalty in 
peacetime. The Russian Federation is an exception, as it has signed, but not yet ra-
tified the Protocol No. 6 while, nevertheless, respecting a moratorium on the death 
penalty since soon after its accession to the Council of Europe in 1996. In 2003, the 
Council of Europe adopted the second legally binding instrument providing for the 
abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances, including war times: Protocol 
No. 13 to the ECHR.19 
The Committee of Ministers monitors the situation in member states to ensure 
compliance with their commitments. It exchanges views on the state of abolition of 
the death penalty every six months and asks states which have not yet signed or rati-
fied Protocols Nos. 6 and 13 to the ECHR to provide information on their inten-
tions. It has been claimed that Europe has become a de facto «death penalty free 
area».20 Yet the Council’s objective is that Europe become a de jure death penalty free 
zone. The Committee of Ministers also issues declarations condemning executions 
taking place in observer states, reiterating its unequivocal opposition to capital pun-
ishment in all places and under all circumstances. The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe has also been a driving force in the movement to abolish the death 
penalty since the 1980s. It has gradually persuaded governments to permanently out-
law the death penalty or to commit to a moratorium on executions. The Assembly 
was at the origin of Protocol No 6 to the ECHR and has since adopted successive 
texts.21 It has also extended its activity to those countries which have observer status 
at the Council of Europe, in particular Japan and the United States of America. Thus, 
it has repeatedly urged the U.S. government to abolish the death penalty.22
18 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms con-
cerning the abolition of the death penalty of 28 April 1983, European Treaty Series No. 114; cf. Stephan 
Breitenmoser, Boris Riemer & Claudia Seitz, Praxis des Europarechts, Grundrechtsschutz, 
Zurich 2006, p.  27; Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Martin Nettesheim & Stefan von Raumer, 
 Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, 4th ed., Baden-Baden 2017, pp. 446 et seqq.; Jörg Paul 
Müller & Luzius Wildhaber, Praxis des Völkerrechts, 3rd ed., Bern 2000, pp. 614 et seqq.
19 Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances of 3 May 2002, E.T.S. No 187; cf. 
Breitenmoser, Riemer & Seitz, supra n. 18, at p. 27; Häfelin et al., supra n. 14, at pp. 69 and 105 
et seq.; Meyer-Ladewig, Nettesheim & von Raumer, supra n. 18, at pp. 462 et seqq.; Müller 
& Schefer, supra n. 14, at p. 49.
20 Cf. David Harris et al. (eds.), Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd ed., Oxford 2014, 
p. 963.
21 In particular, Resolution 1253 (2001, Doc. 9115) of 25 June 2001 and Recommendation 1760 (2006, 
Doc. 10911) of 28 June 2006 of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.
22 Cf. Resolution 1807 (2011) of 14  April 2011; Helen Keller, Todesstrafe vorbehalten. Zulässige 
 Einschränkung internationaler Menschenrechtsgarantien durch die Vereinigten Staaten?, 23 Swiss Rev. 
Int’l & Eur. L. (SZIER/RSDIE) (2003), 113–142.
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2. The European Court of Human Rights’ Case-law
The ECtHR has ruled since 1989 that the exposure to the pervasive and growing fear 
of execution  – the so called «death row phenomenon»  – is in violation of the 
ECHR.23 In addition, the Court has been asking member states, as addressed states 
in an extradition process, to require firm diplomatic assurances from requesting 
countries that persons to be extradited or expelled will not be sentenced to death.24 
This principle has been followed by courts in numerous countries, also outside of 
Europe, including Canada25 and South Africa.26 The ECtHR also held in 2005 that 
capital punishment in peacetime had come to be regarded as an unacceptable form of 
punishment which was no longer permissible under Article 2 of the Convention.27 In 
2010, the ECtHR considered that the death penalty involved the deliberate and pre-
meditated destruction of a human being by the state authorities.28
23 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, App. No. 14038/88. In this decision, the 
ECtHR found for the first time that the state’s responsibility could be engaged if it decided to extradite a 
person who risked being subjected to ill-treatment in the requesting country. In this case, the Court held 
that there would be a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) 
of the ECHR if he were to be extradited to the United States due to a real risk of being put on «death 
row», treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3; cf. Breitenmoser, Riemer & Seitz, 
supra n. 18, at p. 23.
24 ECtHR, Cruz Varas v. Sweden, Judgment of 20 March 1991, App. No. 15576/89; ECtHR, Vilvarajah 
and Others v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 30 October 1991, App. Nos. 13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 
13447/87; 13448/87; ECtHR, Chahal v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 15  November 1996, App. 
No. 22414/93; ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, Judgment of 28 February 2008, App. No. 37201/06; ECtHR, 
Baysakov and Others v. Ukraine, Judgment of 18 February 2010, App. No. 54131/08; ECtHR, Klein v. 
Russia, Judgment of 1  April 2010, App. No.  24268/08; ECtHR, Babar Ahmad and Others v. United 
Kingdom, Judgment of 10 April 2012, App. No. 24027/07; ECtHR, Omar Othman v. United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 17 January 2012, App. No. 8139/09, this was the first time that the Court had found that an 
expulsion would also be in violation of Article 6, which reflects the international consensus that the use 
of evidence obtained through torture makes a fair trial impossible.; cf. Breitenmoser, Riemer & 
Seitz, supra n. 18, at p. 320.
25 Human Rights Committee, Judge v. Canada, supra n. 10, at para. 10.4.
26 In July 2012, the Constitutional Court of South Africa found that deporting individuals to a state in 
which they might face execution would violate the right to life of the persons concerned; Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others, Tsebe and Others, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another, 
Tsebe and Others, CCT 110/11, CCT 126/11, (2012) ZACC 16 73.
27 ECtHR, Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12  May 2005, App. No.  46221/99, para.  88.  The Court also 
found that the evolution towards the complete abolition of the death penalty, in law and in practice, 
within all 47 Council of Europe member states had demonstrated that Article  2 ECHR had been 
amended to prohibit the death penalty in all circumstances.
28 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 March 2010, App. No. 61498/08.
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C. The Complete Abolition of the Death Penalty by the EU
Today the prohibition of the death penalty is one of the essential requirements for 
membership not only in the Council of Europe but also for accession to the European 
Union (EU). The latter confirmed and reinforced this trend by adopting the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter). The EU Charter states in Article 2 
paragraph 2 that no one shall be condemned to the death penalty or executed. The 
EU Charter guarantees, in accordance with the long-standing practice of the EC-
tHR,29 that a person shall not be exposed to the risk of the death penalty, be it 
through removal, expulsion or extradition, either within or outside of Europe.30 The 
countries of Europe have thus, by general practice and belief, achieved the prohibition 
of the death penalty, made it legally binding and given it an imperative nature. It must 
be concluded that the ban is part of the solid core of human rights in Europe and al-
lows for no exceptions, therefore it must be acknowledged as regional ius cogens.31 
D. The Death Penalty in the United States
In the United States, the arguments for and against the capital punishment have been 
subject of countless debates.32 After the end of World War II, the number of execu-
tions carried out in the United States declined rapidly and culminated in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision Furman.33 In this judgment the Court determined 
29 Cf. supra n. 23 and 24. 
30 Article 19 para. 2 EU Charter; for the case-law since Soering cf. Breitenmoser, Riemer & Seitz, 
supra n. 18, at p. 38 et seqq.
31 Cf. Breitenmoser, Riemer & Seitz, supra n. 18, at p. 23; Martina Caroni & Maya Taylan, 
Zwingendes Völkerrecht, recht 2015, pp. 55–66, p. 64; Fausto De Quadros, La Convention Euro-
péenne des Droits de l’Homme: un cas de ius cogens régional?, in: Ulrich Beyerlin, Michael Bothe, Rainer 
Hoffmann & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung, Festschrift für 
Rudolf Bernhardt, Berlin/Heidelberg 1995, p. 560, with further references; Sévrine Knuchel, Jus 
Cogens: Identification and Enforcement of Peremptory Norms, Zurich 2015, p. 56 et seqq.; Eva Kor-
nicker, Ius Cogens und Umweltvölkerrecht, Kriterien, Quellen und Rechtsfolgen zwingender Völker-
rechtsnormen und deren Anwendung auf das Umweltvölkerrecht, Diss., Basel/Frankfurt am Main 1997, 
pp. 63 et seqq.; Roger Nobs, Volksinitiative und Völkerrecht, Eine Studie zur Volksinitiative im 
 Kontext der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses zum 
Völkerrecht, St. Gallen 2006, p. 111; Chiara Piras & Stephan Breitenmoser, Das Verbot der 
Todesstrafe als regionales ius cogens, Aktuelle Juristische Praxis (AJP), 2011, 331–338, at 335 et seqq.; 
Tristan Zimmermann, Quelles normes impératives du droit international comme limite à l’exercice 
du droit d’initiative par le peuple?, AJP 2007, 748–760, at 758; more reserved Helen Keller, Volks-
rechte und Menschenrechte in Sachen Todesstrafe, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26 August 2010, p. 21.
32 Cf. a comprehensive collection of arguments discussed in the United States in Barry Latzer & 
David McCord, Death Penalty Cases, Leading U.S. Supreme Court Cases on Capital Punishment, 3rd 
ed., New York 2011, pp. 9 et seqq. 
33 United States Supreme Court, Furman v. Georgia, 29 June 1972, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); cf. Keller, supra 
n. 22, p. 117.
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that the death penalty was unconstitutional, as it was being applied in an arbitrary 
and discriminatory manner, contrary to the Eighth34 and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution.35 
In Gregg36 the U.S. Supreme Court set forth two main features that capital sen-
tencing procedures must employ in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment 
ban on «cruel and unusual punishments». First, the scheme must provide objective 
criteria to direct and limit the death sentencing discretion. Second, the scheme must 
allow the judge or jury to take into account the character and record of the individual 
defendant.37 
In Ford38 the Supreme Court made a preliminary finding that the Eighth Amend-
ment bars states from inflicting capital punishment upon persons with a mental dis-
order. 
In 2002, the Court ruled in Atkins,39 that since so few states allowed execution of 
the mentally retarded, the practice had become «unusual». Moreover, justifications 
for the death penalty, such as retribution on the part of the defendant and deterrence 
of capital crimes by prospective offenders, did not apply to the mentally retarded. 
Accordingly, the Court categorically excluded such persons from execution under 
the Eighth Amendment.40 
In Thompson41 the Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment 
 prohibits the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or 
her offense.42 
In Roper43 the Supreme Court ruled that the opposition to juvenile death penalty 
in the majority of states, the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books 
and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice provide sufficient 
evidence that society viewed juveniles as «categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal». Since a majority of states had rejected the imposition of the death penalty 
34 The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: «Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.» This amendment prohibits the federal 
government from imposing unduly harsh penalties on criminal defendants, either as the price for obtain-
ing pretrial release or as punishment for crime after conviction; cf. Martin Kau, in: Katharina Pabel & 
Stefanie Schmahl (eds.), IntKomm EMRK, Köln/Berlin/München 2015, Article 3, para. 4 and 112 et 
seqq.
35 Cf. Hood & Hoyle, supra n. 15, p. 129.
36 United States Supreme Court, Gregg v. Georgia, 2 July 1976, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
37 In their concurring opinions Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall held that the «cruel and unusual 
punishments clause must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.»
38 United States Supreme Court, Ford v. Wainwright, 26 June 1986, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
39 United States Supreme Court, Atkins v. Virginia, 20 June 2002, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
40 Cf. Keller, supra n. 22, p. 119 et seq.
41 United States Supreme Court, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 29 June 1988, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
42 Cf. Keller, supra n. 22, p. 119.
43 United States Supreme Court, Roper v. Simmons, 1 March 2005, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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on juvenile offenders under the age of 18, the Court held that this was required by the 
Eighth Amendment.44
E. A Lack of Consensus
While the endeavors to enforce a global ban on capital punishment are limited by the 
heterogeneity of the states still practicing it, like – amongst many others – the United 
States, their different cultural backgrounds, as well as different religious and moral 
conceptions and therefore a lack of consensus on this issue, Europe has shown on a 
regional level that common standards, procedures and values can be enforced beyond 
national borders. The abolishment of the death penalty in Europe shows the practical 
significance of the emergence of supranational45 human rights protection mecha-
nisms in states with a consensus on common human rights perceptions and stand-
ards.46 On a global level, states are instead still far from a universal abolishment of the 
death penalty.47
III. Data Protection and the Fallen Concept of a «Safe Harbor»
A. Data Protection in Europe 
1. Activities by the Council of Europe
In the mid-1970s, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted 
various resolutions on the protection of personal data, referring to Article 8 of the 
44 Cf. for a short overview Müller & Schefer, supra n. 14, p. 50. Cf. also Jones v. Chappell, 31 F.Supp. 
3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 16 July 2014, as to the systemic delay in California’s death penalty system 
rendering it unconstitutional; Patricia Egli, Das System zum Vollzug der Todesstrafe als grausame 
und ungewöhnliche Bestrafung, Jusletter, 30 March 2015.
45 The concept of supra-nationality is closely connected with the EU as a whole and the ECtHR in the 
framework of the Council of Europe due to its essential characteristics, especially the independence of its 
bodies and the majority principle in its decisions; cf. Stephan Breitenmoser & Robert Wey-
eneth, Europarecht, 3rd ed., Zurich/St. Gallen 2017, pp. 20 et seqq.; Matthias Herdegen, 
 Europarecht, 19th ed., Munich 2017, pp. 76 et seqq.; Thomas Oppermann, Claus Dieter Classen 
& Martin Nettesheim, Europarecht, 7th ed., Munich 2016, pp. 21 et seqq.
46 As to the legal nature of the prohibition of the death penalty as ordre public, cf. Andreas Donatsch, 
Internationale Rechtshilfe unter Einbezug der Amtshilfe im Steuerrecht, in: Zürcher Grundrisse des 
Strafrechts, 2nd ed., Zurich 2015, pp. 80 and 91; Müller & Wildhaber, supra n. 18, pp. 103 et seqq.; 
Anne Peters, Völkerrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 4th ed., Zurich 2016, p. 85 et seq.; Weyeneth, supra 
n.  14, pp. 114–125, pp. 117 and 120; Robert Weyeneth, Der nationale und internationale ordre 
public im Rahmen der grenzüberschreitenden Amtshilfe in Steuersachen, Diss., Basel 2017. 
47 Cf. Saul Lehrfreund & Parvais Jabbar, Constitutional Developments and the Restriction of the 
Death Penalty: Judicial Activism in the Commonwealth, 18 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 2013, pp. 512–519, 
p. 518.
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ECHR.48 In order to prevent abuses in the storing, processing and dissemination of 
personal information by means of electronic data banks in the private sector, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided that legislative measures 
had to be taken in order to protect the privacy of individuals. In consideration of the 
urgency to take steps to prevent divergences between the laws of member states of the 
Council of Europe, and pending the elaboration of an international agreement in 
this field, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe agreed on 26 Sep-
tember 1973 on Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of individuals 
vis-à-vis electronic data banks in the private sector.49 
2. Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard  
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
After four years of preparation, on 28 January 1981, the Council of Europe set a mile-
stone in data protection by adopting Convention 108 for the Protection of Individu-
als with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108).50 Con-
vention 108 has been ratified by 47 countries so far, including all EU member states, 
most member states of the Council of Europe and one non- member state.51 The Con-
vention’s potential as a universal standard and its open character still serves as a basis 
for promoting data protection on a global level. 
Convention 108 applies to all data processing carried out by both the private and 
public sectors, such as data processing by the judiciary and law enforcement authori-
48 The concept of «the right to privacy» first emerged in international law in Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, stating that «no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.»
49 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 26 September 1973 at the 224th meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies. One year later, the Committee of Ministers observed that the use of electronic data banks by 
public authorities had given rise to increasing concern about the protection of the privacy of individuals. 
Given that the adoption of common principles in the field of data protection is apt to contribute towards 
a solution of issues in the member states of the Council of Europe and can help to prevent the creation of 
unjustified divergences between the laws of the member states on this subject, the Committee of Minis-
ters issued Resolution (74) 29 on the protection of the privacy of individuals vis-à-vis electronic data 
banks in the public sector (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 September 1974 at the 236th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). Both recommendations advised taking all the necessary steps in the 
private and the public sector to put certain principles on the protection of the privacy of individuals into 
effect.
50 Cf. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
of 28 January 1981, E.T.S. No. 108; Breitenmoser & Weyeneth, supra n. 45, No. 1300 et seqq. 
51 Uruguay, the first non-European country, acceded in August 2013, and Marocco, Mauritius and Senegal 
are in the process of formalizing accession.
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ties.52 It protects the individual against abuses, which may accompany the collection 
and processing of personal data, and seeks, at the same time, to regulate the trans- 
border flow of personal data. The Convention contains several basic principles for 
data protection which each state must incorporate into its domestic law before the 
Convention enters into force. According to Convention 108, data protection primar-
ily deals with the protection of natural persons; however, the contracting parties may 
extend data protection to legal persons, such as business companies and associations 
in their domestic law.
The Convention has played a major role in setting up legislative policies for most 
member states of the Council of Europe. In this context, the issue of data protection 
has been regarded from the outset as a matter of great structural importance for a 
modern society in which the processing of personal data is assuming an increasingly 
important role. In 1999, Convention 108 was amended to enable the EU to become 
a party.53 In 2001, an Additional Protocol to Convention 108 was adopted, introduc-
ing provisions on trans-border data flows to non-parties, so-called third countries, 
and on the mandatory establishment of national data protection supervisory author-
ities.54 
Due to the emerging privacy challenges resulting from the increasing use of new 
information and communication technologies, the globalization of processes and the 
even greater flows of personal data, the Convention has been revised.55 This revision 
will, at the same time, strengthen both the Convention’s evaluation and follow-up 
mechanism. Thus, on 18 December 2012, the consultative committee of the Conven-
tion presented propositions for a modernization of it;56 on 23 November 2014, the ad 
hoc Committee on data protection presented its draft explanatory report of the mod-
ernized version of the Convention 108,57 and on 3 May 2016, the Committee pro-
52 Regarding the collection and processing of personal data, the principles laid down in Convention 108 
concern, in particular, fair and lawful collection and automatic processing of data, stored for specified 
legitimate purposes, be adequate, relevant and not excessive as well as accurate (principle of proportion-
ality).
53 Council of Europe, Amendments to the Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to au-
tomatic processing of Personal Data (E.T.S. No 181) allowing the European Communities to accede, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers, in Strasbourg, on 15 June 1999; cf. Article 23 (2) of the Conven-
tion 108 in its amended form.
54 Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention for the protection of individuals with regard 
to automatic processing of personal data, regarding supervisory authorities and trans-border data flows.
55 Cf. the Judgments by the Strasbourg Court affirming the need for a strong protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data: ECtHR, Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, Judgment of 12 January 
2016, App. No.  37138/14 and ECtHR, Zakharov v. Russia, Judgment of 4  December 2015, App. 
No. 47143/06.
56 Propositions of a modernization of the Convention by the consultative committee of the Convention, 
18 December 2012, T-PD_2012_04_rev4_E.
57 Draft explanatory report of the modernized version of the Convention 108 by the ad hoc Committee on 
data protection of 23 November 2014, CAHDATA(2014)06.
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duced a consolidated version of the modernization proposals.58 The draft has been 
discussed in the competent rapporteur group for over a year now.59 In the meantime, 
the EU adopted a new data protection regime, which will be applied by the (more 
homogeneous) 28 EU member states by 25 May 2018. The new EU data protection 
rules are more far reaching and thus partly incompatible with the old standards of the 
original 1981 Convention and its Protocol.60 An early adoption of the revised Con-
vention 108 will therefore avoid the risk of potential inconsistencies between the 
legal frameworks of the Council of Europe and the EU and ensure that the Conven-
tion 108 will continue to represent the best treaty-based international data protec-
tion standards.61
3. Data Protection Afforded by the European Court of Human Rights
The collection, storage and disclosure of information about an individual by the state 
can interfere with the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 ECHR. 
Such an interference breaches Article 8 ECHR, unless it is «in accordance with the 
law», pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 of Arti-
cle 8 and is, in addition, «necessary in a democratic society» to achieve those aims.62 
58 Consolidated version of the modernization proposals of Convention 108 with reservations by the ad hoc 
Committee on data protection of 3  May 2016, CAHDATA(2016)01.  Switzerland ratified the Con-
vention No. 108 on 2 October 1997 and its Additional Protocol on 20 December 2007. The Convention 
entered into force for Switzerland on 1 February 1998 and its Additional Protocol on 1 April 2008. 
59 Cf. the speeches and presentations of the Director Jörg Polakiewicz on the 53rd meeting of the Committee 
of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI) of 23 March 2017.
60 Cf. Chapter III.A.5.
61 Cf. also the Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU of 18 December 2014: Accession by the European Union to the 
ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454, n. 187 et seqq., as to the power of EU member states to lay down higher stand-
ards of protection of fundamental rights. Jörg Polakiewicz, Outside, but not that far, Schriften des 
Europainstitus der Universität des Saarlandes, vol. 4, 2017, pp. 381–406.
62 Cf. ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden, Judgment of 26 March 1987, App. No. 9248/81, in which the ECtHR 
ruled that the storing and the release of personal information contained in a secret police-register was not 
a violation of the right to respect for private life, since the interference couldn’t be said to have been dis-
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; in ECtHR, Amann v. Switzerland, Judgment of 16 Febru-
ary 2000, App. No. 27798/95, the ECtHR decided that the Public Prosecutor Office’s interception and 
recording of a telephone call received by the applicant from a person at the former Soviet embassy in Berne 
couldn’t be considered to have been «in accordance with the law» since – at that time – Swiss law did not 
indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and conditions of exercise of the authorities’ discretionary power 
in this area; in ECtHR, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 4 December 2008, App. Nos. 
30562/04 and 30566/04, the ECtHR had to consider whether the retention by the authorities of finger-
prints, DNA profiles and cellular samples of persons who were suspected but not convicted of offences 
constituted a justified interference with their private life and ruled that there was no fair balance between 
the competing public and private interests in this case and that the United Kingdom had overstepped any 
acceptable margin of appreciation (para. 125); Harris, O’Boyle, Bates, Buckley, supra n. 20, p. 559.
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There is a variety of case law of the ECtHR with reference to the admissibility of 
access to personal data,63 the balancing of data protection with the freedom of expres-
sion,64 on challenges in online data protection,65 correspondence,66 criminal record 
data bases,67 GPS data,68 identity,69 information concerning professional activities,70 
interception of communication,71 the obligations for duty bearers,72 photos,73 the 
63 Cf. ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden, supra n. 62; ECtHR, Gaskin v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 
1989, App. No. 10454/83; Odièvre v. France, Judgment of 13 February 2003 (GC), App. No. 42326/98; 
ECtHR, K.H. and Others v. Slovakia, Judgment of 28 April 2009, App. No. 32881/04; ECtHR, Godelli 
v. Italy, Judgment of 25 September 2012, App. No. 33783/09.
64 ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, Judgment of 24  June 2004, App. No.  59320/00; ECtHR, Axel 
Springer AG v. Germany, Judgment of 7 February 2012 (GC), App. No. 39954/08; ECtHR, Von Han-
nover v. Germany (No. 2), Judgment of 7 February 2012 (GC), App. Nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08.
65 ECtHR, K.U. v. Finland, Judgment of 2 December 2008, App. No. 2872/02.
66 ECtHR, Malone v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 August 1984, App. No. 8691/79; ECtHR, Leander 
v. Sweden, supra n. 62; ECtHR, Gaskin v. United Kingdom, supra n. 63; ECtHR, McMichael v. United 
Kingdom, Judgment of 24 February 1995, App. No. 16424/90; ECtHR, Amann v. Switzerland, supra 
n. 62; ECtHR, Rotaru v. Romania, Judgment of 4 May 2000 (GC), App. No. 28341/95; ECtHR, M.G. 
v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 24 September 2002, App. No. 39393/98; ECtHR, Turkey v. Slovakia, 
Judgment of 14 February 2006, App. No. 57986/00; ECtHR, Cemalettin Canli v. Turkey, Judgment of 
18  November 2008, App. No.  22427/04; ECtHR, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, supra n.  62; 
ECtHR, Haralambie v. Romania, Judgment of 27 October 2009, App. No. 21737/03; ECtHR, Dalea v. 
France, Judgment of 2  February 2010, App. No.  964/07; ECtHR, Shimovolos v. Russia, Judgment of 
21 June 2011, App. No. 30194/09; ECtHR, Khelili v. Switzerland, Judgment of 18 October 2011, App. 
No. 16188/07; ECtHR, Bernh Larsen Holding SA and Others v. Norway, Judgment of 14 March 2013, 
App. No. 24117/08. 
67 ECtHR, B.B. v. France, Judgment of 17 December 2009, App. No. 5335/06; ECtHR, M.M. v. United 
Kingdom, Judgment of 13 November 2012, App. No. 24029/07.
68 ECtHR, Uzun v. Germany, Judgment of 2 September 2010, App. No. 35623/05. 
69 ECtHR, Odièvre v. France, supra n. 63; ECtHR, Ciubotaru v. Modova, Judgment of 27 April 2010, App. 
No. 27138/04; ECtHR, Godelli v. Italy, Judgment of 25 September 2012, App. No. 33783/09. 
70 ECtHR, Niemietz v. Germany, Judgment of 16 December 1992, App. No. 13710/88; ECtHR, Michaud 
v. France, Judgment of 6 December 2012, App. No. 12323/11.
71 ECtHR, Malone v. United Kingdom, supra n. 66; ECtHR, Kruslin v. France, Judgment of 24 April 1990, 
App. No. 11801/85; ECtHR, Halford v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 June 1997, App. No. 20605/92; 
ECtHR, Lambert v. France, Judgment of 24 August 1998, App. No. 23618; ECtHR, Amann v. Switzer-
land, supra n. 62; ECtHR, Cotlet v. Romania, Judgment of 3 June 2003, App. No. 38565; ECtHR, Cop-
land v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 3 April 2007, App. No. 62617/00; ECtHR, Liberty and Others v. 
United Kingdom, Judgment of 1 July 2008, App. No. 58243; ECtHR, Szuluk v. United Kingdom, Judg-
ment of 2 June 2009, App. No. 36936/05.
72 ECtHR, I. v. Finland, Judgment of 17 July 2008, App. No. 20511/03; ECtHR, B.B. v. France, supra n. 67; 
ECtHR, Mosley v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 May 2011, App. No. 48009/08. 
73 ECtHR, Von Hannover v. Germany, supra n. 64; ECtHR, Sciacca v. Italy, Judgment of 11 January 2005, 
App. No. 50774/99. 
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right to be forgotten,74 the right to object,75 sensitive categories of data,76 surveillance 
methods,77 video surveillance78 and voice samples.79 Furthermore, the ECtHR has 
ruled that the right to access to personal data can be derived from the right to respect 
for private life and it recognized the interest of a person to obtain information on his 
origins.80 
As to DNA samples, the ECtHR expressed in its judgment Van der Velden81 the 
view that cellular material went beyond the scope of identifying features like finger-
prints and that given the use such material could have in the future, its systematic 
retention was sufficiently intrusive to constitute an interference with Article  8 
ECHR. In the Marper case,82 which concerned the retention of fingerprints, DNA 
samples and profiles of individuals suspected of wrongdoing but not convicted of any 
offence,83 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR unanimously held that the «blanket 
and indiscriminate» nature of the retention of fingerprints, cellular samples and 
DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences failed to strike a fair 
balance between the competing public and private interests involved and constituted 
therefore a disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to respect for pri-
vate life.84 
74 ECtHR, Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, Judgment of 6 June 2006, App. No. 62332/00.
75 ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden, supra n. 62; ECtHR, M.S. v. Sweden, Judgment of 27 August 1997, App. 
No. 20837/92; ECtHR, Rotaru v. Romania, supra n. 66; ECtHR, Mosley v. United Kingdom, supra n. 72. 
76 ECtHR, I. v. Finland, supra n. 72; ECtHR, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, supra n. 62; ECtHR, 
Michaud v. France, supra n. 70.
77 ECtHR, Klass and Others v. Germany, Judgment of 6  September 1978, App. No.  5029/71; ECtHR, 
 Rotaru v. Romania, supra n. 66; ECtHR, Taylor-Sabori v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 22 October 
2002, App. No.  47114/99; ECtHR, Allan v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 5  November 2002, App. 
No. 48539/99; ECtHR, Vetter v. France, Judgment of 31 May 2005, App. No. 59842/00; ECtHR, Bykov 
v. Russia, Judgment of 10 March 2009 (GC), App. No. 4378/02; ECtHR, Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 18 May 2010, App. No. 26839/05; ECtHR, Uzun v. Germany, supra n. 68; ECtHR, Associa-
tion «21 Décembre 1989» and Others v. Romania, Judgment of 24 May 2011, App. Nos. 33810/07 and 
18817/08; ECtHR, Sher and others v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 20 October 2015, App. No. 5201/11; 
ECtHR, Zakharov v. Russia, supra n. 55; ECtHR, Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, supra n. 55 as to a legisla-
tion on secret anti-terrorist surveillance.
78 ECtHR, Peck v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 January 2003, App. No. 44647/98; ECtHR, Köpke v. 
Germany, Judgment of 5 October 2010, App. No. 420/07.
79 ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 25  September 2001, App. No.  44787/98; 
ECtHR, Wisse v. France, Judgment of 20 December 2005, App. No. 71611/01.
80 ECtHR, Gaskin v. United Kingdom, supra n. 63; ECtHR, Odièvre v. France, supra n. 63.
81 ECtHR, Van der Velden v. Netherlands, Judgment of 7 December 2006, App. No. 29514/05.
82 ECtHR, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, supra n. 62.
83 As to the privacy rights and the retention of DNA profiles of persons suspected, but not convicted of a 
criminal offence on a national database, cf. Hilary Biehler, The Right to Privacy and the Retention 
of DNA Profiles: Getting the Balance Right, 19 Eur. H. Rts. L. Rev. (2014), pp. 479–489, pp. 482 et seqq.
84 ECtHR, S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, supra n. 62, para. 101.
Swiss Review of International and European Law 550
Stephan Breitenmoser & Chiara Piras
In the case Z. v. Finland,85 the applicant complained that her medical record,86 
including details of her HIV status, had been disclosed and published during a crim-
inal trial. The ECtHR accepted that the interest in protecting the confidentiality of 
medical data can be outweighed by the interest in investigating and prosecuting a 
crime. On the other hand, it found that making medical data accessible to the public 
and publishing the applicant’s identity and medical condition in the Court of Ap-
peal’s judgment was not justified and, therefore, gave rise to a violation of Article 8 
ECHR. 
In the case of G.S.B.,87 which concerned the transmission of the applicant’s bank 
account details to the U.S. tax authorities in connection with an administrative 
 cooperation agreement between Switzerland and the United States,88 the Court 
 accepted that Switzerland had a major interest in acceding to the U.S. request for 
administrative cooperation in order to enable the U.S. authorities to identify any 
assets which might have been concealed in Switzerland. Furthermore, it was recog-
nized that the U.S. tax authorities’ allegations against Swiss banks were liable to jeop-
ardize the very survival of the applicant bank, a major employer and player in the 
Swiss economy.89 Given Switzerland’s interest in finding an effective legal solution in 
cooperation with the United States, it pursued – so the Court – a legitimate aim 
within the meaning of Article 8 paragraph 2 of the ECHR.90 
4. Data Protection Under the Aegis of the EU 
At the end of 1990, the European Commission seemed concerned that a lack of con-
sistency in data protection across its member states could hamper the development of 
the internal market in a range of areas. It therefore submitted a proposal for a direc-
tive in order to harmonize the national laws on data protection in the private and 
most parts of the public sector.91 
85 ECtHR, Z. v. Finland, Judgment of 25 February 1997, App. No. 22009/93.
86 Cf. as to health data also ECtHR, M.S. v. Sweden, supra n. 75; ECtHR, L.L. v. France, Judgment of 
10 October 2006, App. No. 7508/02; ECtHR, I. v. Finland, supra n. 72; ECtHR, Biriuk v. Lithuania, 
Judgment of 25 November 2008, App. No. 23373/03; ECtHR, Szuluk v. United Kingdom, supra n. 71. 
87 ECtHR, G.S.B. v. Switzerland, Judgment of 22 December 2015, App. No. 28601/11.
88 Cf. also ECtHR, M.N. and others v. San Marino, Judgment of 7 July 2015, App. No. 28005/12, in which 
the Court established that information retrieved from banking documents «undoubtedly» amounted 
to personal data concerning an individual – and were therefore protected by Article 8 ECHR – irrespec-
tively of it being sensitive information or not (para. 51–55).
89 ECtHR, G.S.B. v. Switzerland, supra n. 87, para. 83. 
90 ECtHR, G.S.B. v. Switzerland, supra n. 87, para. 92. 
91 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation) dated 25 January 2012 COM(2012) 11 final, p. 18.
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5. Legislative and Political Instruments on Data Protection
The original treaties of the European Communities did not contain any reference to 
human rights or their protection. In 1995, after four years of negotiation, the EU set 
a milestone in the history of personal data protection by adopting the Data Protec-
tion Directive 95/46/EC.92 As the aim of adopting the Data Protection Directive 
was harmonization of data protection law on the national level, the directive affords 
a degree of specificity comparable to that of the (then) existing national data protec-
tion laws. For the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), «Directive 95/46 is intended 
(…) to ensure that the level of protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data is equivalent in all member states».93 
Consequently, the EU member states had only limited freedom to maneuver when 
implementing the Directive. The Directive encompassed all key elements of Article 8 
ECHR. It was based on the 1980 Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
 Development (OECD) «Recommendations of the Council concerning Guidelines 
governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data»,94 
which, although not-binding, have also been very influential, particularly in coun-
tries outside Europe such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan. All EU 
member states have transposed the Directive into national law, including the new 
member states, as well as the non-EU member states that are part of the European 
Economic Area (EEA),95 namely Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, and Switzer-
land with regard to its bilateral and sectorial treaties with the EU. Moreover, the 
Commission found itself compelled to launch legal actions for improper implemen-
tation of the Directive. The first legal action after the adoption of the Directive was 
directed against Germany and led to a ruling by the CJEU in March 201096 stating 
that the requirement of a «complete independence» for a supervisory authority 
means that it should be free from any external influence.97 
92 Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 281, 23 November 1995, p. 31.
93 CJEU, joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de 
Crédito (ASNEF) and Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v. Adminis-
tración del Estado, Judgment of 24 November 2011, EU:C:2011:777, para. 28–29.
94 OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy 
and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data of 23  September 1980, C(80)58/FINAL, which have been 
amended on 11 July 2013, C(2013)79.
95 Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ L 1, 3 January 1994, p. 3, which entered into force on 
1 January 1994. Cf. the Decision of the EEA joint Committee No 144/2017 of 7 July 2017 amending 
Annex XI (Electronic communication, audiovisual services and information society) to the EEA Agree-
ment with regard to the incorporation of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield into the EEA Agreement.
96 CJEU, C-518/07, Commission supported by European Data Protection Supervisor v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, Judgment of 9 March 2010, EU:C:2010:125.
97 CJEU, C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, supra n. 96, at para. 30; Cf. also CJEU, C-614/10, Commission 
v. Austria, Judgment of 16 October 2012, EU:C:2012:631 and CJEU, C-288/12, Commission v. Hungary, 
Judgment of 8 April 2014, EU:C:2014:237.
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Besides the Directive 95/46/EC and other regulations,98 the EU Charter is one 
of the most significant instruments for data protection in Europe. The EU Charter 
not only guarantees respect for private and family life in Article 7, but also establishes 
the right to data protection in Article 8, explicitly raising the level of protection to 
that of a fundamental right in EU law. The EU Charter, which has been integrated 
into the Lisbon Treaty, has a legally binding effect on the institutions and bodies of 
the EU, and on the member states when implementing EU law. Consequently, EU 
institutions, as well as member states, must observe and guarantee this right, which 
also applies to member states when implementing Union law.99 Formulated several 
years after the Data Protection Directive, Article 8 of the EU Charter must be under-
stood as embodying pre-existing EU data protection law. The EU Charter, therefore, 
not only explicitly mentions a right to data protection in Article 8 paragraph 1, but 
also refers to key data protection principles in paragraph 2 of the norm. Finally, par-
agraph 3 ensures that an independent authority will control the implementation of 
these principles.100 
98 Cf. also Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 
on the establishment of «Eurodac» for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of 
Re gulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac 
data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational manage-
ment of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice, OJ L 180, 29 June 2013, p. 1; 
cf. also Articles 28 et seqq. of the Regulation (EU) No. 794/2016 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) 
and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 
2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA, OJ L 135, 24 May 2016, p. 53.
99 Cf. Article 51 of the EU Charter. To the scope of application of the EU Charter, cf. CJEU, C-617/10, 
Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, Judgment of 26 February 2013, EU:C:2013:105.
100 Before the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty on 1  December 2009, the legislation concerning data 
 protection in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) was divided between the first pillar (data 
protection for private and commercial purposes, with the use of the supranational community method) 
and the third pillar (data protection for law enforcement purposes, at traditional intergovernmental 
level). As the pillar structure disappeared with the Lisbon Treaty, the development of a clearer and more 
effective data protection system gained a stronger basis. Nevertheless, the old pillar structure is still 
visible in different legislative instruments which are still in force. Besides the above-mentioned Directive 
95/46/EC on data protection, the most significant of the former first-pillar instruments are Directive 
2002/58/EC on e-privacy (Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector [Directive on privacy and electronic communications], OJ L 201, 31 July 2002, 
p. 37), which was modified in 2009, Directive 2006/24/EC on data retention (Directive 2006/24/EC 
of the European Parliament and the of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated 
or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105/54, 13 April 
2006, p. 54) which was declared invalid by the Court of Justice on 8 April 2014, and Regulation (EC) 
No. 45/2001 on processing of personal data by Community institutions and bodies. A former third-pil-
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On 25 January 2012, the European Commission proposed a comprehensive and 
wide-ranging review of the EU’s 1995 data protection rules to strengthen online pri-
vacy rights. This was due to rapid technological developments and new challenges for 
data protection through social networking sites, cloud computing, location-based 
services and smart cards, all consequences of globalization, as well as the result of the 
current fragmentation of data protection in the different member states of the EU. 
The proposals presented by the European Commission consisted of two main 
changes: 
(1)  a new General Data Protection Regulation to supersede Directive 95/46/EC, in 
order to modernize the principles enshrined in the Directive and for the private 
sector and most of the public sector in the member states,101 and
(2)  a new Directive102 to replace the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA 
for the area of criminal law enforcement.103 
lar instrument which is noteworthy is the Council Framework Decision of November 2008 on the 
protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and criminal justice, a sector not cov-
ered by the Directive 95/46/EC. The Framework decision only applies to police and judicial exchange 
among member states, EU authorities and associated systems, excluding domestic data. Moreover, Arti-
cle 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides that everyone has the 
right to the protection of personal data concerning them. It also states that the Parliament and the 
Council shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the member states when 
carrying out activities that fall within the scope of EU law. Finally, in December 2009, the European 
Council approved a new multi-annual program regarding the AFSJ for the period of 2010 to 2014: the 
so-called Stockholm Program which was followed by two communications of the Commission adopted 
on 11  March 2014 to set out political priorities for the post-Stockholm Program. Shortly after, on 
2 April 2014, the Parliament adopted a resolution on the mid-term review of the Stockholm Program, 
whilst the European Council defined in its conclusions of 26–27 June 2014 the strategic guidelines for 
legislative and operational planning for the coming years within the AFSJ pursuant to Article 68 TFEU. 
One of the key objectives was a better protection of personal data in the EU.
101 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (General Data Protection Regulation) of 25 January 2012, COM(2012) 11 final.
102 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and 
the free movement of such data of 25 January 2012, COM(2012) 10 final.
103 Cf. also Federico Ferretti, Data Protection and the Legitimate Interest of Data Controllers: 
Much Ado About Nothing or the Winter of Rights?, 51 Common Market Law Review (2014), pp. 
843–868, pp. 851 et seqq. In the light of the Snowden revelations in 2013, the 7th hearing of the Euro-
pean Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Inquiry on Mass 
 Surveillance of EU Citizens took place on 14 October 2013 in Brussels. The inquiry was mandated by 
the European Parliament Resolution of 4  July 2013 on the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) 
 surveillance program, surveillance bodies in various member states and their impact on EU citizens’ 
privacy, 2013/2682(RSP). The resolution, inter alia, instructed LIBE «to conduct an in-depth inquiry 
into the matter in collaboration with national parliaments and the EU–U.S. expert group set up by the 
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The new Regulation104 entered into force on 24 May 2016 and shall apply from 
25 May 2018. The new Directive105 entered into force on 5 May 2016 and EU member 
states have to transpose it into their national law by 6 May 2018. The main changes 
are the following:
(1)  an expanded territorial reach, catching data controllers and processors outside 
the EU whose processing activities relate to the offering of goods or services (even 
if for free) to, or monitoring the behavior (within the EU) of, EU data subjects;
(2)  accountability and privacy by design, placing accountability obligations on data 
controllers to demonstrate compliance; 
(3)  Data Protection Officers as part of the accountability program of data control-
lers and processors; 
(4)  direct obligations for data processors, which include an obligation to maintain a 
written record of processing activities carried out on behalf of each controller, 
designate a data protection officer where required, appoint a representative 
(when not established in the EU) in certain circumstances and notify the con-
troller on becoming aware of a personal data breach without undue delay. 
The new rules mean that the new EU Regulation and Directive will not only be ap-
plicable for companies based in the EU (or their subsidiaries in the EU), but also for 
third country-based companies that are offering goods or services to EU data sub-
jects. Although there are still a number of open questions along the way, it is certain 
that numerous U.S. or Swiss organizations that have no local presence in the EU will 
also be in scope of the EU legislation. 
Historically, the Swiss and the EU data protection legislations are closely tied. 
This is mainly due to the mechanism developed by the EU to provide for legal cer-
tainty as to the transfer of personal data to a third country from the EU. According 
to Article 25(6) of the Directive 95/46/EC, the European Commission may deter-
mine – and EU member states are bound by such decision – that a third country 
Commission and to report back» by the end of the year. The focus of the 7th hearing was «on the ques-
tion of whether the alleged surveillance activities would, if confirmed, be in violation of the law, whether 
at international, Council of Europe, EU or national level».
104 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4 May 
2016, p. 1.
105 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the pro-
tection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework De-
cision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119, 4 May 2016, p. 89.
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ensures an adequate level of protection of personal data transferred from the EU 
(«Commission adequacy finding»). On 26 July 2000, the Commission issued De-
cision 2000/518/EC stating that for all the activities falling within the scope of the 
Directive, Switzerland was considered as providing an adequate level of protection.106 
Hence the draft of a revised Swiss Data Protection Act was based in due considera-
tion of the EU data protection regulation. According to the envisaged timeline, the 
revised Swiss Data Protection Act should be enacted around the same period as the 
EU legislation, in 2018.107 
6. Judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU 
In the last years, the Court of Justice of the EU has had the chance to rule over data 
protection issues on several occasions: In a multitude of cases, the Court was able to 
work out the concept of personal data,108 establish rules for the processing of personal 
data109 and work out criteria for making data processing legitimate.110 
In the case of Lindqvist,111 the Court had to rule on the publication of personal 
data on the internet and define the transfer of personal data to third countries. Addi-
tionally, the Court had to establish rules on various aspects of data protection: The 
106 OJ L 215, 25 August 2000, p. 1.
107 Bruno Baeriswyl, Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen DSG, digma 2017, p. 4 et seqq.; Sandra Husi- 
Stämpfli, DSG-Revision: Schritt in die richtige Richtung, digma 2017, p. 50 et seqq.; David Rosen-
thal, Der Vorentwurf für ein neues Datenschutzgesetz: Was er bedeutet, Jusletter, 20 February 2017, 
p. 42; Beat Rudin, Anpassungsbedarf in den Kantonen, digma 2017, p. 58 et seqq. 
108 CJEU, C-342/12, Worten, Judgment of 30 May 2013, EU:C:2013:355; CJEU, C-141/12 and C-372/12, 
YS and Others, Judgment of 17 July 2014, EU:C:2014:2081.
109 CJEU, C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, Satamedia Oy, Judgment of 
16 December 2008, EU:C:2008:727; CJEU, C-553/07, College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rot-
terdam v. M.E.E. Rijkeboer Netherlands, Judgment of 7 May 2009, EU:C:2009:293; CJEU, C-518/07, 
Commission v. Germany, supra n. 96; CJEU, C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR, 
Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, Judgment of 9 November 2010, EU:C:2010:662; CJEU, C-468/10 and 
C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito and Federación de Comercio 
Electrónico y Marketing Directo v. Administración del Estado, supra n. 93; CJEU, T-190/10, Egan and 
Hackett v. Parliament, Judgment of 28 March 2012, EU:T:2012:165; CJEU, C-614/10, Commission v. 
Austria, supra n. 97; CJEU, C-119/12, Josef Probst v. mr.nexnet GmbH, Judgment of 22 November 2012, 
EU:C:2012:748; CJEU, C-342/12, Worten, supra n. 108; CJEU, C-473/12, IPI, Judgment of 7 Novem-
ber 2013, EU:C:2013:715; CJEU, C-486/12, X, Judgment of 12  December 2013, EU:C:2013:836; 
CJEU, C-288/12, Commission v. Hungary, supra n. 97; CJEU, C-683/13, Pharmacontinente – Saúde e 
Higiene and Others, order of 19 June 2014, EU:C:2014:2028.
110 CJEU, C-342/12, Worten, supra n. 108; CJEU, C-683/13, Pharmacontinente – Saúde e Higiene and 
Others, supra n. 109.
111 CJEU, C-101/01, Lindqvist, Judgment of 6 November 2003, EU:C:2014:2028.
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processing of data by the internet112 and by internet service providers,113 by publicly 
available electronic communication services,114 the rights to access of a data subject115 
and to access to documents,116 the obligation to inform a subject of the processing of 
his data117 and on the retention,118 disclosure and erasure of personal data.119 A num-
ber of cases raised data protection issues associated with rights enshrined in the EU 
Charter.120 Moreover, the Court ruled on several actions for failure of member states 
to fulfill their treaty obligations in connection with data protection issues,121 and on 
further data protection issues arising from other specific areas of the treaties, such as 
112 CJEU, C-461/10, Bonnier Audio AB, Earbooks AB, norstedts Förlagsgrupp AB, Piratförlaget AB, Story-
side AB v. Perfect Communication Sweden AB, Judgment of 19 April 2012, EU:C:2012:219.
113 CJEU, C-275/06, Productores de Musica de España (Promusicae) v. Telefonica de España SAU, Judgment 
of 29 January 2008, EU:C:2008:54; CJEU, C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, 
compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL, Judgment of 24 November 2011, EU:C:2011:771.
114 CJEU, C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, Seitlinger and Others, Judgment of 8  April 
2014, EU:C:2014:238. 
115 CJEU, C-553/07, College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v. M.E.E. Rijkeboer Nether-
lands, supra n. 109; CJEU, T-190/10, Egan and Hackett v. Parliament, supra n. 109; CJEU, C-486/12, 
X, supra n. 109; CJEU, C-141/12 and C-372/12, YS and Others, supra n. 108; cf. the Opinion of Advo-
cate General Kokott on CJEU, C-434/16, Peter Nowak v. Data Protection Commissioner, delivered on 
20 July 2017, EU:C:2017:582, on the question whether an examination script may constitute personal 
data.
116 CJEU, C-28/08 P, Commission v. The Bavarian Lager Co. Ltd, European Data Protection Supervisor, 
Judgment of 29 June 2010, EU:C:2010:378; CJEU, T-82/09, Dennekamp v. Parliament, Judgment of 
23 November 2011, EU:T:2011:688; General Court, T-214/11, ClientEarth and PAN Europe v. EFSA 
(on appeal), Judgment of 13 September 2013, EU:T:2013:483.
117 CJEU, C-473/12, IPI, supra n. 109. 
118 CJEU, C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, Seitlinger and Others, supra n.  114; CJEU, 
joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Postoch telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v. Tom Watson and Others, Judgment of 21 December 2016, EU:C:2016:970.
119 CJEU, C-553/07, College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v. M.E.E. Rijkeboer Nether-
lands, supra n. 109.
120 CJEU, C-524/06, Heinz Huber v. Bundesrepublik Germany, Judgment of 16 December 2008, EU:C:-
2008:724; CJEU, C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR, Hartmut Eifert v. Land 
Hessen, supra n.  109; CJEU, C-291/12, Schwarz, Judgment of 17  October 2013, EU:C:2013:670; 
CJEU, C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, Seitlinger and Others, supra n. 114.
121 CJEU, C-518/07, Commission v. Germany, supra n. 96; CJEU, C-28/08 P, Commission v. The Bavarian 
Lager Co. Ltd, European Data Protection Supervisor, supra n.  116; CJEU, C-614/10, Commission v. 
Austria, supra n. 97; CJEU, C-270/11, Commission v. Sweden, Judgment of 30 May 2013, EU:C:2013:339; 
CJEU, C-288/12, Commission v. Hungary, supra n. 97.
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the transfer of medical data,122 the publication of information on beneficiaries of 
agricultural aid123 and on the activities of the European Anti-Fraud Office.124 
In the case of European Parliament v. Council of the European Union,125 the Court 
annulled the Council’s decision concerning the conclusion of an agreement between 
the European Community and the United States on the processing and transfer to 
the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection of personal passenger name re-
cords data and the Commission’s decision on the adequate protection of those data. 
In the case Rechnungshof,126 the Court had to rule on the protection of individu-
als regarding the processing of personal data under the Directive 95/46/EC with re-
gard to the disclosure of data on the income of employees of institutions subject to 
control by the Rechnungshof. 
In the case of Google Spain,127 the Court ruled on the material and territorial 
scope of data protection concerning internet search engines, the processing of data 
contained on websites and the searching for, indexing and storage of such data. Also, 
the Court had to decide on the responsibility of the operator of said engine. 
The decision in the case of Schrems,128 which provided a multitude of topics for 
discussion, will be outlined below.
122 European Union Civil Service Tribunal, F-46/09, action under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, Candidate 
for a post as a member of the contract staff at the European Parliament v. European Parliament, Judgment 
of 5 July 2011, EU:F:2011:101.
123 CJEU, C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR, Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, supra 
n. 109.
124 Court of first Instance, T-259/03, Nikolaou v. Commission, Judgment of 12  September 2007, 
EU:T:2007:254.
125 CJEU, joined cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 
Judgment of 30 May 2006, EU:C:2006:346. The Court ruled that the transfer of passenger name re-
cords data constituted «processing operations concerning public security and the activities of the State 
in areas of criminal law». This trespassed the limits of Article 3(2) of the Data Protection Directive, 
which specifically excludes the processing of data relating to activities provided for under the second and 
third pillars. 
126 CJEU, joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk and 
Others and between Christa Neukomm, Joseph Lauermann and Österreichischer Rundfunk, Judgment of 
20 May 2003, EU:C:2003:294.
127 CJEU, C-131/12, Google Spain, Judgment of 13 May 2014, EU:C:2014:317; cf. Julie Dupont-Las-
salle, Beaucoup de bruit pour rien?, La précarité du «droit à l’oubli numérique» consacré par la Cour 
de justice de l’Union européenne dans l’affaire Google Spain, 26 Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l’homme (2015), pp. 987–1019, pp. 994 et seqq.
128 CJEU, C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Judgment of 6  October 2015, 
EU:C:2015:650. Cf. BGer 1B_185/2016, 1B_186/2016, 1B_188/2016 (16 November 2016), as to Face-
book Switzerland.
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B. U.S. Legal System on Data Protection
Unlike European jurisdictions, the United States does not have a dedicated data pro-
tection law.129 The right to privacy in the United States protects only against the 
federal government’s intrusion into an individual’s private affairs. Hence, the legisla-
tion specific to the issue of personal data protection is limited to data processed by 
and in custody of the federal government. In the private sector, data protection is 
primarily regulated by industry, on a sector-by-sector basis with numerous sources of 
privacy law.130 Therefore, industries in the United States are mostly self-regulated, 
including most private corporations, data-mining businesses, personal data reposito-
ries and internet-based social-networking sites, although there are multiple privacy 
laws at the state level.131
1. Constitutional Level 
In the U.S. legal system, the main source serving as a basis for data protection guar-
antee on a constitutional level is the Fourth Amendment.132 It guarantees the «right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures», which is understood to encompass certain data 
attributed to a person, such as telephone or banking records.133 Nevertheless, these 
guarantees only apply if the individual had a «legitimate expectation of privacy»,134 
which excludes all cases where an individual has voluntarily turned over the informa-
tion in question to a third party. This broad exemption has been scrutinized lately by 
the courts considering the changing electronic and technical environment: In the 
case of ACLU v. Clapper135 it was recognized that «surveillance capabilities are vast» 
and that «it is difficult if not impossible to avoid exposing a wealth of information 
about oneself to those surveillance», and hence lose the «legitimate expectation of 
privacy».136 
129 Cf. McKay Cunningham, Complying with international data protection law, University of Cincin-
nati Law Review, vol. 2, No. 84, 20 June 2015, pp. 2 et seq. 
130 Cf. Jacqueline Klosek, Data protection in the information age, Westport 2000, pp. 130 et seqq. 
131 Cf. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International 
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Data Privacy Standards, 25 Yale J. Int’l L. (2000), p. 27 et seqq. with 
further references. 
132 Cf. Ian Brown, Keeping Our Secrets?, Designing Internet Technologies for the Public Good, 19 Eur. 
H. Rts. L. Rev. (2014), pp. 369–377, p. 375.
133 U.S. Supreme Court, Smith v. Maryland, 20 June 1979, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and U.S. Supreme Court, 
United States v. Miller, 21 April 1976, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
134 U.S. Supreme Court, Katz v. United States, Judgment of 18 December 1967, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
135 U.S. Court of Appeals for the second circuit, ACLU v. Clapper, Judgment of 7 May 2015, No. 14–42.
136 Cf. also U.S. Court of Appeals for the second circuit, United States v. Stavros M. Ganias, No. 12–240 
(2d Cir. 17 June 2014), as the Fourth Amendment has been applied to create a potential «right to dele-
tion» of outdated data held by U.S. law enforcement agencies.
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2. Privacy Act of 1974
Amongst the U.S. laws, the Privacy Act of 1974137 is the closest analogue to a Euro-
pean data protection law. It seeks to comprehensively regulate personal data process-
ing, even if only with respect to federal government departments and agencies. It 
regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of all types of personal information, by 
all types of federal agencies, including law enforcement agencies. The Privacy Act 
contains most of the elements of the EU right to personal data protection, yet only on 
a very general level. Nevertheless, its guaranties apply only to information contained 
within a «system of records,» which is defined by the statute and the courts as only 
including a system from which the government agency retrieves information based 
on a personal identifier, like a name or social security number.138 The Privacy Act 
requires transparency in personal data processing: When information is collected 
from individuals, they must be told of the nature of the governmental139 and personal 
information stored by government agencies and whether it is used to make determi-
nations about individuals. This information has to be maintained with «such accu-
racy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fair-
ness to the individual in the determination».140 As for proportionality, the Privacy 
Act requires that the agency «maintains in its records only such information about 
an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency re-
quired to be accomplished by statute or by executive order of the President».141 More-
over, special protection is afforded to the sensitive data category of information on 
how individuals exercise their freedom of expression and association. Nevertheless, 
the protection of this sensitive data category of the First Amendment responsibilities 
does not apply to «an authorized law enforcement activity».142 Finally, the Privacy 
Act gives individuals the right of access to their records and the right to request cor-
rection of «any portion thereof which the individual believes is not accurate, rele-
vant, timely or complete».143 Legal oversight under the Privacy Act is conducted 
largely by private litigants and the courts: The Privacy Act gives individuals the right 
to sue the government for violations of their Privacy Act rights and to obtain dam-
ages or injunctive relief.144 
137 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. para. 552a.
138 Cf. e.g. U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, Henke v. U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Judgment of 17 May 1996, 83 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
139 Cf. 5 U.S.C. para. 552a(e)(3).
140 Cf. 5 U.S.C. para. 552a(e)(5).
141 Cf. 5 U.S.C. para. 552a(e)(1).
142 Cf. 5 U.S.C. para.552a(e)(7).
143 Cf. 5 U.S.C. para. 552a(d).
144 Cf. 5 U.S.C. para. 552a(g).
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3. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act 
The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988145 complements the 
Privacy Act by describing the way computer matching involving federal agencies 
could be performed and by adding certain protections for individuals applying for 
and receiving federal benefits. The Act adds procedural requirements for agencies to 
follow when engaging in computer-matching activities, providing matching subjects 
with opportunities to receive notice and refuting adverse information before having 
a benefit denied or terminated. It also requires that agencies engaged in matching 
activities establish Data Protection Boards to oversee those activities. Subsequently, 
the U.S. Congress enacted the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Amend-
ments of 1990,146 which further clarified the due process provisions.
4. Legislative Initiatives
On 21  October 2015, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the draft Judicial 
Redress Act of 2015, which aims to mitigate a main procedural shortcoming of the 
Privacy Act of 1974, namely its non-applicability to non-U.S. citizens or residents. It 
authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) to designate foreign countries or 
regional economic integration organizations, whose natural citizens will then be 
 allowed to bring civil actions under the Privacy Act of 1974 against certain U.S. 
 government agencies for purposes of accessing, amending, or redressing unlawful 
disclosures of records maintained by an agency. The entry into force of the Judicial 
Redress Act also paved the way for the signature of the EU-U.S. Data Protection 
Umbrella Agreement.147 Whilst a step in the right direction, the Redress Act still lags 
significantly behind granting equal rights to U.S. and EU citizens under the U.S. 
legislation. 
5. Privacy Rights and Surveillance Activities by U.S. Authorities 
The Snowden revelations have shown that it is common practice in the United States 
for corporations established, controlled by or active in the United States to be or-
dered by the U.S. authorities to produce data from servers they own or operate in 
other countries. Furthermore, the U.S. authorities can order the corporations to not 
inform either the authorities in the countries from which they pull the data, the en-
145 Pub. L. No 100-503.
146 Pub. L. No 101-508.
147 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of 
 personal information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal 
offences, OJ L 336, 10 December 2016, p. 3; cf. Statement by Commissioner Věra Jourová on the signa-
ture of the Judicial Redress Act by President Obama; Brussels, 24 February 2016.
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tities whose data they are handing over, or the data subjects of such data disclosures.148 
The surveillance of communications in the interest of protecting national security, 
conducted by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) both within and outside the 
United States, especially through the bulk phone metadata surveillance program149 
and, in particular, surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA),150 have a clear impact on an individual’s right to privacy. The judicial inter-
pretations of FISA and rulings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
were largely kept secret, thus not allowing affected persons to know the law with 
sufficient precision.151 The current oversight system of the NSA’s activities fails to ef-
fectively protect the rights of the persons affected;152 as a matter of fact, persons af-
fected have no access to effective remedies in case of abuse.153
The increasing level of surveillance by arms of the state is also the subject of grow-
ing concern in the United States. In the decision U.S. v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme 
Court acknowledged that «the government’s unrestrained power to assemble data 
that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse».154 This view has been 
confirmed in the more recent decision Riley v. California,155 in which it was held that 
the police forces may not, in general, search for digital information on a mobile phone 
seized from an arrestee without a warrant.
148 Cf. Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice in a Global Digital Envi-
ronment, 3 Eur. H. Rts. L. Rev, (2014), pp. 243–251, p. 249.
149 Section 215 of the U.S. Patriot Act.
150 Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
151 In order to justify such methods, the United States have repeatedly taken the position that Article 17 
ICCPR, which determines that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation, does not 
apply with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction, but outside its territory. This interpretation of 
the ICCPR is in contrast with the interpretation of Article 2, para. 1 ICCPR supported by the Human 
Rights Committee’s established jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 
and state practice; cf. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report of 
the United States of America, adopted by the Committee at its 110th session, 10–28 March 2014, ad-
vanced unedited version, para. 4.
152 Cf. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, which extends some safeguards to non-U.S. citizens «to the 
maximum extent feasible consistent with the national security» with only limited protection against 
excessive surveillance.
153 Human Rights Committee, supra n. 151, para. 22. A further example of the U.S. cross-border data gath-
ering is the inception of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010, which requires 
large-scale data transfers concerning U.S. citizens holding accounts in foreign countries to the U.S. tax 
authorities. This has been criticized as not compatible with the level of European data protection; cf. 19th 
annual report of the Swiss Federal Data Protection Commissioner 2011/2012, para. 1.9.1., p. 88.
154 U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, Judgment of 23 January 2012.
155 U.S. Supreme Court, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, Judgment of 25 June 2014.
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C. Data Transfers from Europe to the United States
1. Cross-border Data Flows Between Europe and the United States 
In Europe, the legal frameworks for trans-border data protection flows are the 
ECHR,156 Convention 108157 and Directive 2016/680,158 while the Organization of 
American States (OAS) has set policy options for member states including guidelines 
on trans-border data protection.159 In the wake of 9/11, the United States has sought 
to conclude agreements with other states and regional bodies to facilitate sharing of 
personal data for law enforcement purposes. In particular, the EU and the United 
States have concluded agreements covering the transfer of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data of airline passengers160 and financial messaging data (SWIFT).161 In the 
private sector, the regulatory mechanism with regard to trans-border data flows be-
tween the EU and the United States as well as with Switzerland162 were directed by 
the «Safe Harbor» agreement.
2. The Fallen Concept of a «Safe Harbor»
With its Decision 2000/520, the European Commission decided in 2000 that the 
EU concept of «Safe Harbor» provided a legitimate basis for transferring personal 
data from the EU to recipients in the United States who have submitted themselves 
to the framework. U.S. companies could self-certify themselves under U.S. law that 
they will comply with the data processing principles defined by the framework. Many 
156 Article 8. 
157 Article 12 (1).
158 Article 35 et seqq.
159 Permanent Council of the OAS, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Preliminary Principles 
and Recommendations on Data Protection, CP/CAJP-2921/10, 17 October 2011, principle No 8.
160 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
passenger name records to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security of 11 August 2012, OJ L 215, 
11 August 2012, p. 5. See also Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investi-
gation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Paolo 
Mengozzi in the Request for an Opinion 1/15 by the CJEU delivered on 8 September 2016, EU:C:-
2016:656; Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, 2011/C 181/02 of 
22 June 2011.
161 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and trans-
fer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program of 27 July 2010, OJ L 8, 13 January 2010, p. 11.
162 U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Privacy principles issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce on 16 February 
2009, CC 0.235.233.6.
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EU companies relied on the «Safe Harbor» privacy framework in order to transfer 
personal data to the United States. 
With its judgment of 6 October 2015, the Court of Justice of the EU put a sudden 
end to the applicability of the «Safe Harbor» agreement. Subject of the procedure in 
the Schrems case was whether U.S. law and practice ensure an adequate level of pro-
tection within the meaning of Article 25 of Directive 95/46.163 The Court elaborated 
that it was incumbent upon the Commission, after it had adopted a decision pursu-
ant to Article 25 paragraph 6 of Directive 95/46, to check periodically whether the 
finding relating to the adequacy of the level of protection ensured by the third coun-
try in question was still factually and legally justified. Such a check – so the Court – is 
required, in any event, when evidence gives rise to doubt in that regard.164 
The Court found that the Commission’s Decision 2000/520 did not refer either 
to the existence in the United States of rules intended to limit any interference, or to 
effective legal protection against the interference.165 According to the Court’s settled 
case-law, the EU legislation involving interference with the fundamental rights guar-
anteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter must lay down clear and precise rules 
governing the scope and application of a measure. The legislation must also contain 
minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose personal data is concerned have suf-
ficient guaranties enabling their data to be effectively protected against the risk of 
abuse and against any unlawful access and use of it.166 Therefore, the Court empha-
sized that legislation has to be limited to what is strictly necessary when it authorizes 
storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose data has been transferred 
from the EU to the United States. There shall be no differentiation, limitation or 
163 CJEU, C-362/14, Schrems, supra n.  128, para.  67.  In this Opinion delivered on 23  September 2015 
Advocate General Yves Bot took the view that the existence of a decision by the Commission finding 
that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection of the personal data transferred cannot 
eliminate or even reduce the national supervisory authorities’ powers under the directive on the process-
ing of personal data. According to the Advocate General, where systemic deficiencies are found in the 
third country to which the personal data is transferred, the member states must be able to take the 
measures necessary to safeguard the fundamental rights protected by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU, which include the right to respect for private and family life and the right to the pro-
tection of personal data. The Advocate General considered furthermore that the access enjoyed by the 
U.S. intelligence services to the transferred data constituted an interference with the right to respect for 
private life and the right to protection of personal data, which are guaranteed by the Charter. Likewise, 
the inability of citizens of the EU to be heard on the question of the surveillance and interception of 
their data in the United States amounted, in the Advocate General’s view, to an interference with the 
right of EU citizens to an effective remedy, protected by the Charter. According to the Advocate Gen-
eral, that interference with fundamental rights was contrary to the principle of proportionality, in par-
ticular because the surveillance carried out by the U.S. intelligence services was a mass and indiscrimi-
nate surveillance. He considered that the Commission decision was invalid.
164 CJEU, C-362/14, Schrems, supra n. 128, para. 76–77.
165 CJEU, C-362/14, Schrems, supra n. 128, para. 88.
166 CJEU, C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, Seitlinger and Others, supra n. 114, para. 54 and 
55 and the case-law cited.
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exception in the light of the objective pursued and without an objective criterion 
being laid down by which to determine the limits of the access of the public authori-
ties to the data, and of its subsequent use.167 In particular, the Court held legislation 
permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalized basis to the content 
of electronic communications as compromising the essence of the fundamental right 
to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the EU Charter.168 Accord-
ingly, the Court underscored the fact that Article  3 paragraph 1 (b) of Decision 
2000/520 needed to be interpreted in accordance with the objective of protecting 
personal data pursued by Directive 95/46, and also in the light of Article 8 of the EU 
Charter. That being so, the Court concluded that in adopting Article 3 of Decision 
2000/520, the Commission exceeded the power which is conferred upon it in Arti-
cle 25 paragraph 6 of Directive 95/46. Read in the light of the EU Charter, Article 3 
of the decision was held invalid,169 and thus, the Safe Harbor decision 2000/520 was 
held invalid.170
D. An Unbridgeable Gap?
Since the Court’s invalidation of the Safe Harbor decision 2000/520, the European 
Commission and the United States have agreed on a new framework for transatlantic 
data flows: The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield. It was formally approved by the European 
Commission on 12 July 2016,171 finding that the Privacy Shield Framework provides 
adequate protection for EU residents to permit transfer of their personal data from 
the EU to the United States. Although the Privacy Shield implements certain princi-
ples, similar to Safe Harbor, it differs in several respects: The Privacy Shield Frame-
work establishes seven Privacy Shield Principles and sixteen additional principles, 
resulting in stronger obligations on U.S. companies handling personal data, defined 
means of redress available for EU individuals, enforcement commitments from U.S. 
agencies, safeguards on U.S. government access, and continuing monitoring of the 
program itself. Nevertheless, the new Privacy Shield must still be criticized for failing 
167 CJEU, C-362/14, Schrems, supra n. 128, para. 91–94. Cf., to this effect, concerning Directive 2006/24/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated 
or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (OJ L 201, 31 July 2002, 
p.  37); CJEU, C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Others, supra n.  114, para.  57 to 
61.  Cf. also BVGer, A.-F.  v. Dienst Überwachung Post- und Fernmeldeverkehr (ÜPF), A-4941/2014 
(9 November 2016).
168 CJEU, C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Others, supra n. 114, para. 39.
169 CJEU, C-362/14, Schrems, supra n. 128, para. 102–104.
170 CJEU, C-362/14, Schrems, supra n. 128, para. 106.
171 Commission implementing Decision of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU–U.S. Privacy 
Shield, OJ L 207, 1 August 2016, p. 1.
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to sufficiently protect the privacy rights of EU nationals, though it is generally seen 
as an improvement in comparison to the «Safe Harbor» agreement.172
IV. Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to present the important role of regional law and in-
stitutions in the development and rise of international human rights standards and 
to outline how the level of protection guaranteed by the European states is far more 
advanced than equivalent regulations on a universal level or in other regions of the 
world. Whilst a universal approach to human rights protection often carries the ex-
pectation of a homogeneous, effective and uniform legislative method, solutions on a 
universal stage are in practice lagging behind the developments accomplished on the 
regional level in Europe. The examples discussed in this article show that the most 
sustainable approach for regulating matters of human rights protection regularly 
takes up the advantages of institutional frames that are narrower and more precise 
than the universal ones. Further, it has been shown that, as to the level of protection 
of human rights, a sharp divide gradually opened up between the EU and the United 
States. As a consequence of the diverse shortcomings of universally applicable human 
rights conventions, the European human rights protection mechanisms have shown 
that states are apt to develop a network of numerous and more far-reaching agree-
ments on the protection of human and minority rights on a regional level, bringing 
Europe steps ahead of other regions of the world in general, and the United States in 
particular. However, we have seen that even in Europe there is a risk of fragmentation 
in the human rights protection level guaranteed by the different organizations. 
By continuously increasing the level of safeguard provided in Europe, both the 
member states of the Council of Europe and the EU are sending a strong signal to the 
international community. Far from being merely an «academic» aspect of the legal 
172 Cf. also BGer 4A_83/2016 (22 September 2016), consid. 3.1., in which the Court proceeded on the 
assumption that the United States did not ensure the same level of protection of personal data as pro-
vided by Swiss law. Starting 12 April 2017, organizations can self-certify to the Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield 
Framework, which replaces the Safe Harbor Agreement between Switzerland and the United States. 
The Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC) considered that the new 
framework guarantees an adequate level of data protection. He has approved the level based on the 
wording of the Swiss–U.S. Privacy Shield and has amended his list under Article 7 of the Ordinance to 
the Data Protection Act for the benefit of companies certified in this connection. The changes include a 
stricter application of data protection principles by participant companies and improved management 
and supervision of the framework by the U.S. authorities. Persons concerned are given specific instru-
ments to enable them to find out directly from certified U.S. companies or the competent authorities 
about data processing and to ensure that any required corrections or deletions are made. People can also 
indirectly influence the processing of their data by the U.S. security services via an ombudsman proce-
dure. In addition, the U.S. authorities have given assurances that they will act to enforce and evaluate 
the new instruments. 
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craft, fragmentation173 has emerged naturally with the increase of international legal 
activity in the area of human rights which may only be controlled by the use of re-
gional cooperation and coordination. In this regard, regional cooperation and coor-
dination is not to be understood in terms of exceptions to international law but as a 
varying, context-sensitive implementation and application of common standards. It 
indicates that local modes of problem-solving are, in general, efficient since they are 
based on a better understanding of the specific circumstances and are therefore a 
better place to take account of local peculiarities, cultural or otherwise.174 
We conclude that human rights are and should be further developed and strength-
ened on a regional level. This may ensure a more efficient or equitable implementation 
of the relevant norms. The resulting fragmentation may then constitute an opportu-
nity to develop and consolidate higher standards in regional human rights protection 
that will affect and assist the development of sustainable human rights protection 
mechanisms on an international level. Therefore, the Vienna Declaration’s calling on 
states to endorse efforts to strengthen regional arrangements and to increase their 
effectiveness, while at the same time stressing the importance of international coop-
eration, has lost nothing of its relevance since its declaration in 1993.
173 Cf. Koskenniemi, supra n. 2.
174 Cf. Christoph Schreuer, Regionalism v. Universalism, 6 Eur. J. Int’l L.  (1995), pp. 477–499, 
p. 477.
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